

WHAT KIND OF SCIENCE SHOULD PSYCHOLOGY BE? THE CASE OF HALLUCINATIONS

Professor Ivan Leudar

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The University of Manchester, the Faculty of Medical and Human Sciences, the School of Psychological Sciences

1a. 'On entering the smoking room where his girlfriend was sitting Simon heard a 'voice of god' which said 'She is evil'. He was very upset by this and afraid that his girlfriend might have overheard the voice.'

1b. 'A few months following the death of her husband Ann was alone in her house thinking about him and missing him. She heard his voice telling her, 'Don't be stupid, it never was like that.', and she had to agree, it never was.'

1c. 'Lucy was on her own in her house and a bit upset. She heard a voice of an old family friend calling her name, 'Lucy!'. This took her back to past occasions when she talked with her friend about her problems. She found the experience reassuring.'

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2. 'Psychology under that name has been recognized as a distinct science from the sixteenth century, when the word was used by Melanchthon, Goclenius and others to designate what was in effect a new science.' (Collingwood, *An Essay on Metaphysics*, p. 106)

3. 'The sixteenth-century proposal for a new science to be called psychology did not arise from any dissatisfaction with logic and ethics as sciences of thought. It arose from the recognition (characteristic of the sixteenth century) that what we call feeling is not a self-critical activity, and therefore not the possible subject-matter of a criteriological science.' (ibid, p. 109)

4. 'These activities were thus not activities of the 'mind', if that word refers to the self-critical activities called thinking. But neither were they activities of the 'body'. To use a Greek word (for Greeks had already made important contributions to this study of feeling) they were activities of the 'psyche', and no better word could have been devised for the study of them than psychology.' (ibid, p. 110)

5. 'Unlike any kind of bodily or physiological functioning, *thought is a self-criticising activity. The body passes no judgement on itself.* Judgement is passed on it by its environment, which continues to support and promote its well-being when it pursues its ends successfully and injures or destroys it when it pursues them otherwise. The mind judges itself, though not always justly. Not content with the simple pursuit of its ends, it also pursues the further end of discovering for itself whether it has pursued them successfully. The sciences of body and mind respectively must take this difference into the account.' (ibid, pp. 107-108, my italics)

6. 'Thus a science of feeling must be 'empirical' (i.e. devoted to ascertaining and classifying 'facts' or things susceptible of observation), but a science of thought must be 'normative', or as I prefer to call it 'criteriological' ... In the sixteenth century the name 'psychology' was invented to designate an 'empirical' science of feeling. In the nineteenth century the idea got about that psychology could not merely supplement the old 'criteriological' sciences by providing a valid approach to the study of feeling, but could replace them by providing an up-to-date and 'scientific' approach to the study of thought. Owing to this misconception there are now in existence two things called 'psychology': a valid and important: 'empirical' science of feeling, and a pseudo-science of thought' (Collingwood, *Principles of Art*, 1938, 171 ff).

7. 'Now Odysseus the spear-famed was left alone, nor did any of the Argives stay beside him, since fear had taken all of them. And troubled, *he spoke then to his own great-hearted spirit: 'Ah me, what will become of me? It will be a great evil if I run, fearing their multitude, yet deadlier if I am caught alone; and Cronos' son drove to flight the rest of the Danaans. Yet still, why does the heart within me debate on these things? Since I know that it is the cowards who walk out of the fighting, but if one is to win honour in battle, he must by all means stand his ground strongly, whether he be struck or strike down another.'* (*The Iliad*, XI, §401-412, my italics).

8. 'The self has as its most fundamental character that of being an object to itself. It takes the attitude of indicating to itself things, persons and their meanings. This attitude is attained by the individual assuming the role of another, or others' (George Herbert Mead, *The Philosophy of the Act*, 1938, p. 445)
9. [Cognitive Revolution] 'was intended to bring "mind" back into human sciences after a long cold winter of objectivism.' (Bruner, *Acts of Meaning*, 1990, p. 1)
10. 'Its aim was to discover and to describe formally the meanings that human beings created out of their encounters with the world. ... It focused upon symbolic activities that human beings employed in constructing and in making sense *not only of the world, but of themselves.*' (ibid, p. 2, my italics)
11. 'The problem of human understanding is a twofold one. *Man knows, and he is also conscious that he knows.* We acquire, possess, and make use of our knowledge; but at the same time, we are aware of our activities as knowers. In consequence, human understanding has developed historically in two complementary ways: it has grown, but at the same time it has deepened, so becoming at once more extensive and more reflective.' (Stephen Toulmin, *Human Understanding*, 1972, p. 1)
12. 'classifying people works on people, changes them, and can even change their past. The process does not stop there. ... To create new ways of classifying people is also to change how we can think of ourselves, to change our sense of self-worth, even how we remember our past.' (Ian Hacking, *The looping effects of human kinds*, 1995, p. 369).

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13. 'Yet still at times, I was helped to believe that it was true manifestations of Grace unto my soul, though I had lost much of the life and savour of it. Now about a week or fortnight after this, I was much followed by this scripture, *Simon, Simon, behold, Satan hath desired to have you*, Luk. 22. 31. and sometimes it would sound so loud within me, yea, and as it were call so strongly after me, that once above all the rest, I turned my head over my shoulder, thinking verily that some man had behind me called to me, being at a great distance.' (John Bunyan, *Grace Abounding*, 1666)
14. 'Socrates ... happened to be making the ascent toward the Symbolon and the house of Andocides, putting some question to Euthyphron the while and sounding him out playfully. Suddenly he stopped short and fell silent, lost a good time in thought; at last he turned back, taking the way through the street of cabinet makers, and called out to the friends who had already gone onward to return, saying that his sign has come to him.' (Plutarch, *On the Sign of Socrates*, 580d-e)
15. 'Like imperfect sleep which, instead of giving more strength to the head, doth but leave it the more exhausted, the result of *mere operations of the imagination* is but to weaken the soul. Instead of nourishment and energy she reaps only lassitude and disgust: whereas *a genuine heavenly vision* yields to her a harvest of ineffable spiritual riches, and an admirable renewal of bodily strength. I alleged these reasons to those who so often accused my visions of being *the work of the enemy of mankind* and the sport of my imagination.' (Teresa of Avila, *Autobiography*; cited by William James, 1902, in *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 21, my emphasis)

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